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We examined participants’ strategy choices and metacognitive judgments during 
arithmetic problem solving. Metacognitive judgments were collected either prospectively or 
retrospectively. We tested whether metacognitive judgments are related to strategy choices on 
the current problems and on the immediately following problems, and age-related differences 
in relations between metacognition and strategy choices. Data showed that both young and 
older adults were able to make accurate retrospective, but not prospective, judgments. 
Moreover, the accuracy of retrospective judgments was comparable in young and older adults 
when participants had to select and execute the better strategy. Metacognitive accuracy was 
even higher in older adults when participants had to only select the better strategy. Finally, 
low-confidence judgments on current items were more frequently followed by better strategy 
selection on immediately succeeding items than high-confidence judgments in both young and 
older adults. Implications of these findings to further our understanding of age-related 
differences and similarities in adults’ metacognitive monitoring and metacognitive regulation 
for strategy selection in the context of arithmetic problem solving are discussed. 








Metacognition refers to processes used to monitor and regulate our mental activities 
(Nelson, 1996). Four decades of research – mainly, but not only, in the memory domain– have 
established that the influence of metacognitive processes on cognitive performance occurs via 
implementation of effective strategies. Specifically, various studies have shown that 
participants who accurately monitor their internal states are more likely to implement 
appropriate strategies to regulate or control their performance, for instance, by allocating 
more time to more difficult items or by selecting the items on which they want to be tested 
(see Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009, for an overview). Despite a number of findings consistent 
with influence of metacognition on cognitive performance, surprisingly little research has 
been carried out to investigate how crucial metacognitive monitoring (i.e., the ability to 
evaluate one’s own performance) and control (i.e., the ability to regulate one’s own 
performance) are involved during strategy selection (for exceptions in the memory domains, 
see Kimball, Smith, & Muntean, 2012; Hines, Touron, & Hertzog, 2009; Touron, Hertzog, & 
Hines, 2007). Thus, we know little about how the accuracy of participants’ estimates impacts 
their strategy choices, and how this changes with age. The present study contributes to these 
issues by examining age-related differences in metacognitive monitoring and metacognitive 
regulation for strategy selection in arithmetic problem solving for several reasons. This 
domain is relevant for everyday life (e.g., managing budgets, etc.). It is also a domain where 
selecting the better strategy leads to significant improvement on performance. Interestingly, 
many previous studies found that older adults are at a disadvantage relative to young adults in 
arithmetic problem solving (see Uittenhove & Lemaire, 2015, for a review). Consequently, 
studying age-related differences in metacognitive skills for strategy selection in arithmetic 
allows to ensure that potential differences observed between age groups at the metacognitive 





outlining the logic of the present work, we first review previous findings on metacognition 
and strategy selection and, then, on metacognition, strategy selection, and aging. 
Metacognition and Strategy Selection 
A plethora of studies have shown that people use a variety of strategies to accomplish 
cognitive tasks and that participants’ performance as well as age-related changes in cognitive 
performance depend on which strategies are used on each item (Siegler, 2007). In arithmetic, 
determiners of participants’ performance like which strategy they use, which type of problems 
they solve, and under what conditions have been studied in great detail (see Kadosh & 
Dowker, 2015 for an overview). However, the role of metacognitive processes on 
participants’ performance, and age-related differences therein, has been much less studied. 
Thus, previous research has not determined if young and older participants are able to monitor 
whether they will select the better strategy on a forthcoming item (i.e., prospective judgment) 
or to estimate their level of confidence associated with a just-selected strategy (i.e., 
retrospective judgment). Yet, being able to estimate past and future strategy selection on each 
problem could be an essential prerequisite for people to efficiently regulate their strategic 
behaviors (e.g., Lovett & Schunn, 1999; Siegler & Araya, 2005). Interestingly, some data 
suggest that both young and older adults can use better strategy judgments to change strategy 
while executing an already-selected strategy (e.g., Ardiale & Lemaire, 2012; Ardiale & 
Lemaire, 2013).  
Ardiale and Lemaire (2012, 2013) asked young and older adults to estimate products 
of two-digit multiplication problems like 37 x 64. Problems were displayed with a cue 
indicating which of two rounding strategies to use. After executing this cued strategy for one 
second (too short to fully complete strategy execution), participants could choose whether to 
change strategy (or not) if they judged that the cued strategy was not the best strategy for this 





that both young and older adults were able to interrupt execution of strategy and switch 
strategy when the cued strategy was not the best one. One important limitation of Ardiale and 
Lemaire’s work is that participants’ better strategy judgments were not based on their own 
strategy selection but on strategies selected by the experimenter. Furthermore, better strategy 
judgements were not directly assessed, as participants were not asked explicitly whether the 
cued strategy was the better or poorer strategy. Although rates of strategy switching may be a 
direct consequence of strategy judgments, participants may have switched strategies on some 
or many items without systematically evaluating whether the cued strategy was the better or 
poorer strategy. To date, it is unknown how young and older adults monitor their chances of 
selecting the better strategy on each item, how such strategy monitoring changes with age 
during adulthood, and whether participants are able to use the result of strategy monitoring to 
regulate subsequent strategy selection (i.e., metacognitive regulation or control). Indeed, most 
previous studies exploring interactions between metacognitive monitoring and regulation 
processes on an item-by-item basis examined whether low levels of confidence in one’s own 
performance on an item lead to the implementation of appropriate strategies on the same item 
(e.g., an increase in study time; Metcalfe & Kornell, 2003; Metcalfe & Kornell, 2005; Nelson 
& Leonesio, 1988; Son & Metcalfe, 2000; Thiede & Dunlosky, 1999). No studies have tested 
whether low confidence in a selected strategy leads participants to adjust their strategy 
selection on an upcoming item.  
The issues of strategy monitoring and strategy regulation are theoretically important 
for models of strategy selection. Some assumptions made by computational models of 
strategy selection are consistent with the hypothesis that being able to introspect on how easy 
it would be to select the better strategy or on the level of uncertainty associated with the 
selected strategy increases the likelihood of choosing the best strategy on each item. 





associative mechanisms such as activating the relative costs/benefits of each strategy and 
selecting the strategy that works best for a given problem on the basis of problem and strategy 
characteristics (Lovett & Anderson, 1996; Lovett & Schunn, 1999; Neches, 1987; Rieskamp 
& Otto, 2006; Siegler & Araya, 2005; Siegler and Shipley, 1995). In addition to associative 
mechanisms, two of the existing computational models assume that strategy choices involve 
metacognitive mechanisms. Specifically, in the Lovett and Schunn’s (1999) Represent, 
Construct, Choose, Learn (RCCL) model, the metacognitive system enables participants to 
interrupt a strategy mid-execution if they estimate that the current strategy is not the best one 
or if it is inappropriate. In Siegler and Araya’s (2005) Strategy, Choice, and Discovery 
Simulation* (SCADS*), the metacognitive system is crucial to create or discover new 
strategies. In sum, models of strategies include assumptions relative to metacognitive 
processes to evaluate the strategies once selected and, possibly to interrupt strategies mid-
execution to switch for a better strategy (RCCL) or to create and discover new legitimate 
strategies (SCADS*). Consistent with this view, Geurten and Lemaire (2017) have recently 
reported some experimental data suggesting that metacognitive processes could be involved 
very early in the strategy selection processes, when participants try to select the better strategy 
on each problem. Specifically, they have shown that participants are able to decide whether a 
cued strategy is the better to solve each problem and to regulate their response decisions 
accordingly. However, in this experiment, participants judged the relevance of the cued 
strategy; they did not estimate their own strategy selection performance. 
In this context, the first goal of the present study was to determine whether young and 
older adults are able to make accurate metacognitive judgments on their own strategy 
selection and whether they rely on these judgments to guide subsequent strategy choices. 
These data could help us determine whether and how metacognitive processes influence 





Metacognition and Strategy Selection in Aging. 
Another important reason to focus on the accuracy of people’s metacognitive 
judgments for strategy selection is that recent research has suggested that some aspects of 
metacognition remain intact with advancing age (see Castel, Middlebrooks, & McGillivray, 
2016, Hertzog, 2016, for overviews). For instance, Hertzog, Kidder, Powell-Moman, and 
Dunlosky (2002) presented participants with either related or unrelated pairs of words and 
asked young and older adults to estimate whether they thought they would be able to recall 
these pairs of words on an upcoming recall test. Results indicated that older adults’ 
metacognitive judgments were closer to their actual memory performance whereas young 
adults were less accurate. Using a similar paradigm except that participants had the 
opportunity to restudy all items after making their metacognitive judgments, Hines, Touron, 
and Hertzog (2009) found that both young and older adults studied items that had been 
assigned lower confidence judgments longer than items that had been assigned higher 
confidence judgments, suggesting no age deficits in using memory monitoring to regulate 
learning. (see also, Eakin, Hertzog, & Harris, 2014; Kuhlmann & Touron, 2011; Price, 
Hertzog, & Dunlosky, 2010; Price & Murray, 2012; Robinson, Hertzog, & Dunlosky, 
2006).These findings argue for a relatively spared ability to monitor and regulate mental 
operations across the adult life span. This sparing suggests that older adults may potentially be 
able to use their good metacognitive skills to partially overcome or compensate for negative 
effects of aging on cognitive performance by investing limited resources into areas that yield 
optimal return (Baltes & Baltes, 1990; Hertzog & Dunlosky, 2011). 
However, results of research that has examined metacognitive monitoring and 
metacognitive regulation in aging are not as consistent as they appear. Several studies found 
age-related changes in metacognitive monitoring and control (e.g., Dunlosky & Connor, 1997; 





Dodson, 2017 for a review). For instance, Bunnell, Baken, and Richards-Ward (1999) found 
that older adults’ metacognitive judgments prior to list presentation or after recall reflected 
overconfidence compared to actual working memory performance. In contrast, young adults 
showed greater metacognitive accuracy. Regarding metacognitive regulation, Souchay and 
Isingrini (2004) found that older adults did not allocate their study time as efficiently as young 
adults during a self-paced learning task. Similar age-related differences were found in a study 
examining whether participants accurately selected items for restudy on the basis of their 
previous metacognitive judgments (Tullis & Benjamin, 2012). 
Contradictory findings regarding age-related differences and similarities in 
metacognition further highlight the importance of studying metacognitive monitoring and 
regulation processes to better understand which aspects of metacognition are spared and 
which aspects are impaired during aging. One potential explanation for inconsistent findings 
regarding age-related differences in metacognition is that older and young adults may 
differentially allocate their cognitive resources to monitoring and performance, depending on 
the task. Indeed, it is now well established that normal aging is frequently characterized by 
decreased attentional and executive resources (see Glisky, 2007, for an overview). In this 
context, it is possible that the accuracy of older adults’ metacognitive judgments and 
regulation depends on the amount of resources required to accomplish cognitive tasks, with 
some tasks requiring more resources than others. Spared metacognitive skills with age would 
be found for less resource-consuming tasks, and age-related changes for more resource-
consuming tasks. Consistent with this possibility, Sacher, Isingrini, and Taconnat (2013) 
found that when young adults made metacognitive judgments in a divided attention situation, 
their pattern of responses mimicked the decrease in metacognitive accuracy observed in older 
adults. Such findings suggests that the availability of cognitive resources is an important 





As these studies were conducted neither in the arithmetic domain nor on strategy 
selection, the second goal of our study was to examine age-related differences in the accuracy 
of metacognitive monitoring and metacognitive regulation for strategy selection in arithmetic 
when the better strategy selection task involves different levels of difficulty. This was 
expected to enable us to determine not only whether there are age-related changes in 
metacognitive monitoring and regulation for strategy selection, but also to inform us on 
factors that possibly influence variations in the accuracy of metacognitive processes with age. 
Overview of the Present Study 
The primary goals of this study were to (a) document age-related differences in 
metacognition for strategy selection while young and older adults are asked to solve 
arithmetic problems, and (b) determine whether these age-related differences are influenced 
by the amount of cognitive resources that are needed to complete the task. Specifically, all 
individuals were given three different tasks, a selection-execution task (i.e., participants were 
given arithmetic problems and had to select the better strategy among two available strategies, 
and keep this selected strategy in mind while executing it), a selection-only task (i.e., 
participants were given arithmetic problems, and were asked to only select the better strategy 
without executing it), and an execution-only task (i.e., participants were given arithmetic 
problems together with the better strategy and had to execute the cued strategy). Previous 
research in this arithmetic task has revealed that selecting and executing the better strategy is 
usually harder and requires more cognitive resources than just selecting the better strategy 
(e.g., Lemaire, Arnaud, & Lecacheur, 2004).  
Empirical works on strategies in arithmetic have shown that strategy selection and 
strategy execution are influenced by participants, stimulus, and situation characteristics 
(Siegler, 2007). These factors act individually and in interaction with each other. For example, 





multiplication problems (e.g., 43x38) with a rounding-down strategy (doing 40x30=1200) or a 
rounding-up strategy (doing 50x40=2000), under different levels of speed/accuracy pressures. 
The authors found that older adults executed the rounding-down strategy more slowly under 
accuracy-pressure conditions than under no-pressure conditions, especially when they solved 
easy problems. Young adults were less affected than older adults by the time-pressure 
manipulation. Such findings show that young and older adults are differently influenced by 
problem and task characteristics. For this reason, the set of problems used in the present 
experiment was carefully selected so as to explore whether problem features that are known to 
influence strategy selection and strategy execution influence metacognitive judgments and 
regulation. The two main problem characteristics tested here were first which strategy is 
better for a given problem (half the problems were best estimated with one strategy, the other 
problems with another strategy) and the size of unit digits (i.e., problems with both unit digits 
vs. one unit digit smaller or larger than 5). 
In the selection-execution and in the selection-only tasks, metacognition was assessed 
using both Ease of Selection judgments (EoS) and Retrospective Confidence Judgments 
(RCJ). Specifically, young and older adults were asked to judge on a trial-by-trial basis the 
ease with which they would select the better strategy (i.e., prospective judgments) or the level 
of confidence associated with their having selected the better strategy (i.e., retrospective 
judgments). The EoS judgments were similar to other classical prospective judgments, such as 
Ease-of-Learning, except that participants were asked to judge their future strategy selection 
instead of judging their future performance. This procedure was used because several studies 
have shown that some aspects of prospective metacognitive judgments (i.e., prediction of 
future performance) differ from retrospective metacognitive judgments (i.e., estimation of the 
accuracy of past responses). For instance, Kelemen, Frost, and Weaver (2000) showed no 





prospective judgments are generally less accurate than retrospective judgments in both young 
and older adults (von der Linden, Löffler, & Schneider, 2016). For instance, Siedlecka, 
Paulewicz, and Wierzchoń (2016) compared prospective and retrospective judgments of 
performance while participants solved anagrams. Participants rated their confidence that a 
particular word was the solution before or after giving their responses. These authors found 
more accurate judgments when participants gave these judgments after relative to before the 
responses. This difference is likely due to retrospective judgments being based on information 
supporting a particular choice due to continuous tracking of evidence such as response 
fluency (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; Fleming, Massoni, Gajdos, & Vergnaud, 2016; 
Siedlecka et al., 2016). Indeed, Siedlecka et al.’s results suggest that the simple act of making 
a response provides an additional cue to improve accuracy of metacognitive judgments. 
Moreover, some data show that prospective judgments are more likely based on recent history 
of performance and, thus, can be biased when the level of difficulty of a task varies from one 
item to the next (e.g., Fleming et al., 2016; Geurten & Meulemans, 2017).  
To assess metacognitive monitoring, different analytical approaches are available. One 
of the most common approaches consists in computing a score of metacognitive accuracy (or 
resolution) reflecting how well one discriminates between correct and incorrect responses 
when making different types of metacognitive judgments. From a statistical perspective, 
several types of index can be computed (e.g., Murayama, Sakaki, Yan, & Smith, 2014). Each 
of them has unique strengths and weaknesses (for a detailed description of the characteristics 
of these metacognitive metrics, see Fleming & Lau, 2014). Here, we used the A’ROC index 
which provides a bias-free measure of metacognition (i.e., this measure is not influenced by 






A similar approach was adopted to assess metacognitive regulation. To determine 
whether participants use the result of their metacognitive monitoring to improve their 
subsequent strategy selection, the non-parametric phi (φ) coefficients was computed to 
estimate the accuracy between metacognitive judgments and rates of subsequent better 
strategy selection. 
Regarding metacognitive monitoring, the hypothesis that strategy selection involves 
metacognitive processes predicts that metacognitive accuracy should be higher than chance 
for both the prospective and the retrospective judgments. Such findings would indicate that 
young and older participants can introspect on their strategy choices. Based on previous 
findings in the metacognition literature, two alternative developmental scenarios were 
possible. First, metacognitive monitoring, as involved in arithmetic strategy selection, 
changes with adults’ age and varies with different task parameters (e.g., Sacher et al., 2013). 
Such a possibility might arise if metacognitive processes depend on available resources, and 
availability of resources varies with participants’ age and experimental tasks/conditions. This 
hypothesis predicts that the accuracy of metacognitive judgments is influenced by 
participants’ age (i.e., it should be lower in older adults), by problem features (i.e., it should 
be lower on most difficult problems), and by selection versus selection-execution tasks (i.e., it 
should be lower in the selection-execution task). Alternatively, metacognitive monitoring is 
an age-invariant, general skill (e.g., Hertzog et al., 2002). That is, it should be stable with age 
during adulthood. 
Regarding metacognitive regulation, no studies have previously examined whether 
people can accurately use metacognitive judgment on one item to regulate their performance 
on the following item. However, previous findings examining how participants rely on the 
result of their metacognitive evaluation to control their performance for the same item suggest 





possible that metacognitive regulation changes with adults’ age and varies with different task 
parameters (e.g., Souchay & Isingrini, 2004). Second, metacognitive monitoring is an age-
invariant skill that is stable with age during the course of adulthood (e.g., Hines et al., 2009).  
In sum, this study had two main goals. First, we examined whether young and older 
adults are able to make accurate metacognitive judgments on strategy selection. We also 
investigated whether participant (young or older), problem (homogeneous or heterogeneous 
unit digits; rounding-down or rounding-up), and task (selection-only, selection-execution, or 
execution-only) characteristics (i.e., factors that are known to affect strategy choices; see 
Lemaire, 2016, for an overview) influence the accuracy of participants’ metacognitive 
judgments for strategy selection. Second, we determined whether participants are able to use 
the result of their metacognitive monitoring to regulate their subsequent strategy choices and 
whether the accuracy of these metacognitive regulatory processes can be influenced by 
participant and task characteristics. 
Method 
Participants 
Sixty six French-speaking participants were tested. There were two age groups: 37 
healthy young adults (29 females; mean age = 21.14 years; SD = 2.01; age range = 18–29) 
and 29 healthy older adults (18 females; mean age = 72.99 years; SD = 6.77; age range = 64–
88). Young adults were undergraduates from Aix-Marseille University who voluntarily 
participated. Older adults were volunteers recruited from the community of Liege in Belgium. 
No older adults were excluded as they all had scores larger than 27 (M = 29.1) in the Mini 
Mental State Examination (MMSE; Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975). Data collection 
stopped when the number of participants was sufficient to reach a predicted power of .80 





effect size, f = .25; Cohen, 1988) with Age as the only between-participant factor. The 
required effect size was determined on the basis of similar research in laboratory settings 
examining strategy selection in young and older adults (Lemaire et al., 2004). Information 
about participants’ sex, age, verbal fluency, and arithmetic fluency was collected at the end of 
the experiment. The latter two variables were assessed using the French version of the Mill-
Hill Vocabulary Scale (Deltour, 1993) and the addition and subtraction-multiplication subtests 
of the French Kit (French, Ekstrom, & Price, 1963). As often found, older participants’ 
arithmetic fluency (139 vs. 108; F(1,64) = 13.45, p < .001, η²p = .17) was larger than that of 
young adults. No differences were found for verbal fluency (22.2 vs. 20.5; F < 2). 
Materials 
The stimuli were 32 multiplication problems presented in a standard form (i.e., a x b) 
with the operands a and b being two-digit numbers. The same problems were used in each 
phase of the experiment in order to allow direct comparisons of participants’ metacognitive 
accuracy between conditions. Based on the size of unit digits, half the problems (N = 16) were 
categorized as homogeneous and half as heterogeneous. Problems with homogeneous unit 
digits had the unit digit of both operands smaller (e.g., 21 x 63) or larger (e.g., 48 x 59) than 5. 
In problems with heterogeneous unit digits, the unit digit of one operand was smaller than 5 
while that of the other operand was larger than 5 (e.g., 32 x 69). These two types of problems 
were included because previous studies found that all participants – whatever their age – 
select the best rounding strategy more easily when the size of the unit digits is homogenous 
than when it is heterogeneous (e.g., LeFevre, Greenham, & Waheed, 1993). Moreover, half 
the problems with either homogeneous or heterogeneous unit digits were so-called rounding-
down problems because they were best estimated (i.e., closest products from the correct 
products) with the rounding-down strategy (e.g., 86 x 21) and half rounding-up problems 





and heterogeneous problems had comparable exact products when solved with each rounding 
strategy (means = 3372 and 3342 for homogeneous and heterogeneous problems, 
respectively). 
Finally, given some effects that are known in arithmetic (see Kadosh & Dowker, 2015, 
for an overview), the following factors were controlled: (a) no operand had a 0 or a 5 unit 
digit, (b) digits were not repeated within operands (e.g., 22 x 54), (c) digits were not repeated 
in the same unit or decade positions across operands (e.g., 52 x 57), (d) no reverse order of 
operands was used (e.g., 46 x 23 vs. 23 x 46), (e) no tie problems such as 24 x 24, were used, 
(f) the first operand was larger than the second operand in half the problems, and (g) the 
operand with the smallest unit digit was in the left position in half the problems (e.g., 42 x 36) 
and in the right position in the other problems (e.g., 23 x 41). 
Procedure 
Institutional Review Board approval was obtained from the local ethic committee 
before data collection began (protocol number: 1516-21). Written consents were obtained 
from participants before the study. Participants were tested individually in a quiet room using 
a laptop computer equipped with E-prime software (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 
2002). They underwent an approximatively 45- to 60-minutes session during which they 
completed three tasks. These three tasks were administered in the following order: (a) 
selection-execution task, (b) selection-only task, and (c) execution-only task. These three 
tasks were administered in that specific order so that the higher cognitive demand of the 
selection-execution task was further enhanced by the novelty of the task while the lower 
cognitive demand of the selection-only task was further alleviated by a higher degree of 
familiarity with the task and with the stimuli (Norman & Shallice, 1986; Stuss et al., 1995). 
Thereby, we hoped to maximize effects of task demands on participants’ metacognitive 





execution task to be contaminated by strategy execution or strategy selection only, which 
would have happened if selection-execution task was taken second or third. Finally, in most 
studies on strategies, participants are usually asked to select and execute strategies. Very 
rarely are they asked to only select strategies. By asking participants to first select and execute 
strategies, the present findings on strategy selection could be compared to previous findings 
so as to determine whether collecting metacognitive judgments results in different findings 
(e.g., it was important to replicate the findings that strategy selection is influenced by problem 
features).   
Before the computational estimation task, participants were told that their task was to 
give an approximate answer to each arithmetic problem that is as close as possible to the 
correct answer without actually calculating the correct answer. To this end, they had to select 
the best strategy between two available strategies, rounding both operands down (rounding-
down strategy) or rounding both operands up (rounding-up strategy) to their closest decades 
on each problem. The better strategy for a given problem was the strategy that yielded the 
answer that was closest to the correct product for this problem. In each task, all participants 
were presented the 32 problems in random order. Moreover, participants had an initial 
practice phase including six arithmetic problems so that participants could get familiarized 
with the apparatus and the general procedure used in each of the three tasks. After this initial 
practice, no participants had difficulties with the procedure. The stimuli were presented in a 
60-point Courier black font in the center of the computer screen. Each problem was preceded 
by a blank screen for 500 ms that was followed by a warning signal (“##”) displayed for 400 
ms. 
Selection-Execution task. The arithmetic problems were presented one by one in the 
center of the computer screen for 3 sec. each. After each arithmetic problem display, 





Specifically, for each problem, participants had to indicate out loud how easy it would be to 
select the better strategy (between the two available strategies, rounding-up or rounding-
down) to estimate the correct product on a 4-point scale (from “very easy” to “very hard”). 
Problems were presented for three seconds, each followed by a blank screen. Participants had 
an unlimited time to make their judgments. The experimenter pressed a response key (1, 2, 3, 
or 4) to move to the next problem as soon as possible after the participant’s response. Once 
EoS judgments were made on every problem, participants were presented with a 
computational estimation task. Specifically, the problems were displayed again, one by one in 
the center of the computer screen for an unlimited duration, and participants were required to 
choose which of the two available (rounding-down or rounding-up) strategies was the better 
strategy to estimate the problems, and then to execute it out loud. Instructions emphasized the 
fact that participants should do nothing more than the initial rounding up or down and 
multiply the rounded operands. Participants were also told that the mixed-rounding strategy 
(i.e., rounding one operand down and the other up to the closest decades) was not available. 
Excluding mixed-rounding strategy aimed at increasing difficulty of strategy choices and, 
thereby, avoiding ceiling effects. The experimenter pressed a response key immediately after 
participant’s response. Only the first response was recorded. Self-corrections were not 
allowed. Each response was immediately followed by assessment of Retrospective 
Confidence Judgment (RCJ) during which participants were instructed to indicate their level 
of confidence in whether they selected the best strategy on a 4-point scale (from “not at all 
confident” to “totally confident”). Participants were asked to make their RCJ out loud. The 
experimenter pressed a response key (1, 2, 3, or 4) to move on to the next problem directly 
after the participant’s response. Once again, participants had as much time as they wanted to 
make their judgments. We recorded participants’ EoS and RCJ judgments on each problem, 





strategy execution (i.e., coded 1 if the estimate differed from the expected estimate given the 
selected strategy, and 0 otherwise), and mean estimation times. 
Selection-only task. The selection-execution task was immediately followed by the 
selection-only task. The two tasks were mostly the same, except that participants were not 
asked to execute (neither out loud nor covertly) the strategy after selecting it in the selection-
only task. After an initial EoS judgment phase, problems were presented one by one in the 
center of the computer screen for an unlimited time. Participants were required to choose 
which of the two strategies (rounding-down or rounding-up) was the better strategy to yield 
the best estimate (defined as the estimate that is closest from exact product). Specifically, they 
were asked to press the “B” key (standing for “Bas” or “Down” in French) on an AZERTY 
keyboard if they thought that the rounding-down strategy was the better strategy and to press 
the “H” key (for “Haut” or “Up” in French) if they thought that the rounding-up strategy was 
the better strategy. As in the previous block, each response was immediately followed by a 
RCJ assessment. We recorded the EoS and RCJ judgments for each problem, the number of 
better strategy selections, and mean selection times. 
Execution-only task. In the final block, the cue strategy was displayed above each 
problem (e.g., RD, 26 x 42), and participants were asked to execute this cued strategy out loud 
(e.g., “20 x 40 = 800”). Once the given strategy was executed, the experimenter pressed a 
response key to move on to the next problem as soon as possible after participant’s response. 
Only the first response was recorded. Self-corrections were not allowed. No metacognitive 







First, we examined age-related differences in strategic variations under each of the 
three selection-execution, selection-only, and execution-only tasks. Then, we tested the 
accuracy of participants’ EoS judgment and RCJ in the selection-execution and in the 
selection-only tasks, and compared these judgments across these two tasks. Finally, we 
determined whether participants were able to use their metacognitive judgments on one 
problem to adjust their strategy selection on the next problem. Given that older adults had 
better arithmetic fluency than young adults, we also conducted our analyses with this variable 
as a covariate. We indicate when the inclusion of the covariate changed our results. Unless 
otherwise noted, differences were significant to at least p < .05. Preliminary analyses 
indicated that no gender effects were significant on any of the dependent variables. 
As classical statistics did not allow us to distinguish between insensitive data (i.e., no 
significant results) and evidence for the null hypothesis (i.e., a real absence of differences 
between two conditions), we chose to use Bayesian statistics in addition to more classical 
frequentist analyses (Dienes, 2014). Bayes factors (B) indicate the relative strength of 
evidence for two theories (e.g., Jarosz & Wiley, 2014). For this reason, with Bayes factors, 
one does not have to worry about corrections for multiple testings (see Dienes, 2011). These 
factors allow three types of conclusions: There is strong evidence for the alternative 
hypothesis (B much greater than 1); there is strong evidence for the null hypothesis (B close 
to 0); and the evidence is insensitive (B close to 1). Lee and Wagenmakers (2014) proposed 
the following decision criteria: Bayes factors greater than 3 or less than 1/3 represent 
substantial evidence against or for the null hypothesis, respectively. Any B value between 1/3 
and 3 indicates that more evidence is needed. In the present experiment, Bayesian tests were 
conducted using the default conservative priors from our software program (JASP, 2014; see 





Age-Related Differences in Strategic Variations 
First, we analyzed age-related differences in strategy selection (in selection-execution 
and selection-only tasks) as well in strategy execution (in selection-execution and execution-
only tasks) as a function of problem types. The results of these analyses are presented as 
supplemental results (S1). These data replicated previous findings on how young and older 
adults select and execute strategies. Like in many studies either in the arithmetic domain or in 
other cognitive domains (see Lemaire, 2016; Uittenhove & Lemaire, 2015, for overviews), 
participants were crucially influenced by problem features. They selected the better strategy 
on each problem when this better strategy was the rounding-up strategy and the problems 
were homogeneous problems. They executed the rounding-down strategy more quickly on 
homogeneous problems. Moreover, both young and older adults were influenced by problem 
features (e.g., both were better at selecting and executing the better strategy on homogeneous 
problems than on heterogeneous problems). Overall, these findings suggest that collecting 
metacognitive judgments on each problem in the present experiment has not influenced young 
and older adults’ strategy choices and strategy execution. 
Age-Related Differences in Metacognitive Accuracy 
After replicating previous findings showing the influence of participants’, problems’ 
and tasks’ characteristics on strategy selection, the main goal of this study was to test the 
influence of these three factors on the accuracy of participants’ metacognitive judgments for 
strategy selection. To achieve this end, we calculated a measure of metacognitive accuracy – 
Area under the ROC curve; A’ROC – based on the EoS and the RCJ in both the selection-
execution and selection-only tasks (see Table 1). The A’ROC is a non-parametric measure 
from signal detection theory which plots the concordances (i.e., a higher judgment on correct 
better strategy selection or a lower judgment on incorrect better strategy selection) against the 





judgment on incorrect better strategy selection) (Kornbrot, 2006). As 4-point scale was used 
in the present experiment, three ROC points were computed for each participant. The curve 
that passes through these points is the ROC curve and the area under this curve was used as an 
index of metacognitive accuracy. An A’ROC of 0.5 indicated no metacognitive discrimination 
between better or poorer strategy selections. As opposed to other traditional measures of 
metacognitive accuracy or resolution (i.e., gamma coefficient, phi coefficient), A’ROC is not 
contaminated by participants’ tendency to give a high or a low confidence rating, allowing to 
separate metacognitive accuracy from metacognitive bias (Fleming & Lau, 2014). However, 
for a more straightforward comparison with prior works examining metacognition in aging, 
we also conducted our analyses using a more traditional measure of metacognition (i.e., 
gamma coefficient). In the present experiment, these two measures were highly related (r = 
.67 for the Selection-Execution task, and r = .77 for the Selection-Only task). The analyses 
carried out on this measure led to the same conclusions as the analyses carried out on the 
A’ROC index. These results are presented as supplemental results (S2). 
---------------------- 
Insert Table 1 About Here  
------------------------ 
We first examined whether individuals were able to make above chance EoS 
judgments and RCJ. Under both the selection-execution and selection-only tasks, results of 
the t tests comparing A’ROC indexes to chance showed that the metacognitive coefficients 
were significantly larger than .50 in both young and older adults for the RCJ, but not for the 
EoS judgments (see Table 2). 
---------------------- 






Next, we examined whether the accuracy of participants’ metacognitive judgments for 
strategy selection varied as a function of age, tasks, and stimulus characteristics. Mean A’ROC 
for both EoS judgments and RCJ were analyzed with mixed-design ANOVAs, 2 (Age: young, 
older) x 2 (Task: Selection-execution, Selection-only) x 2 (Unit Digit: homogeneous, 
heterogeneous), with age as the only between-participants factor.  
Analyses of EoS judgments showed no main or interaction effects both in the 
selection-only and in the selection-execution tasks (all ps>.18, all Bs < 1 and > .30). 
Concerning the accuracy of RCJ (see Figure 1), the Age x Task, F(1,61) = 5.48, MSe = 1.65, 
η²p = .08, B = 3.23, the Task x Unit Digit, F(1,61) = 8.43, MSe = 1.47, η²p = .12, B = 8.61, and 
the Age x Task x Unit Digit interactions, F(1,61) = 6.89, MSe = 1.47, η²p = .10, B = 4.67, 
were significant. Specifically, results of pairwise comparisons showed that young adults had 
lower metacognitive accuracy than older adults in the selection-only task, but this effect was 
larger on homogeneous unit digits (.71 vs. .84), F(1,61) = 5.75, MSe = 3.18, B = 3.56, than on 
heterogeneous unit digits (.55 vs. .60), F(1,61) = 3.54, MSe = 0.95, B = 3.05. Both age groups 
had comparable levels of metacognitive accuracy when tested under the selection-execution 
task, F = 2.78; B = 0.89. Moreover, older participants (.66) showed higher overall 
metacognitive accuracy than young participants (.61) when assessed with the A’ROC index, 
F(1,61) = 3.96, MSe = 2.43, η²p = .06, B = 1.289. However, Bayesian analyses suggest that 
more evidence is needed before drawing definite conclusions about this overall effect. This 
probably results from the fact that older adults show better metacognitive accuracy only for 
the selection-only task and not for the strategy-execution task. Participants also had higher 
metacognitive accuracy for the selection-only task (.67) than for the selection-execution task 
(.60), F(1,61) = 13.39, MSe = 1.65, η²p = .17, B > 10. They also had higher metacognitive 
accuracy on problems with homogeneous unit digits (.71) than on problems with 






Insert Figure 1 About Here  
------------------------ 
Age-Related Differences in Metacognitive Regulation 
To examine the influence of participants’ metacognitive judgments on their 
subsequent strategy selection, we calculated mean confidence scores for each participant (as 
participants’ EoS accuracy did not differ from chance, the analyses were only conducted on 
RCJ scores). The mean confidence scores for each participant were used as cut-off scores to 
determine whether a low-confidence or a high-confidence response was given on each item. 
This procedure enabled us to control for participants’ tendency to give a high or a low 
confidence rating (response bias). Indeed, with this procedure, the classification of a specific 
judgment made by one participant as reflecting high- or low-confidence depended on the 
other judgments made by this participant. Low-confidence responses were coded as 0 and 
high-confidence responses were coded as 1. To determine whether participants use the result 
of their metacognitive monitoring to improve their subsequent strategy selection, non-
parametric phi (φ) coefficients were computed between RCJ scores (coded 0; 1) and rates of 
subsequent better strategy selection (coded 0; 1) for each participant. The correlation between 
participants’ confidence judgments on one problem and better strategy selection on the 
following problem significantly differed from 0 in both the selection-only task (φyoung = -.54 
and φold = -.44) and in the selection-execution tasks (φyoung = -.31 and φold = -.49), all ps < .01. 
These negative correlations indicate that the better strategy is more likely to be selected when 
a low-confidence response was given on the previous problem and less likely to be selected 
when a high-confidence response was given on the previous problem. Moreover, to ensure 
that these correlations did not reflect post-error adjustments (i.e., a cognitive control effect 





al., 2009), the influence of better strategy selection on current problems was partialled out. All 
correlations remained significant in both the selection-only (φp-young = -.36, φp-old = -.33) and 
the selection-execution tasks (φp-young = -30, φp-old = -.36), all ps < .001. Differences in the size 
of correlations between young and older adults were tested using R-to-Z comparisons. None 
of the age differences were significant, all ps > .20 
Overall, our results indicate that participants were unable to predict the ease with 
which they would select the better strategy on each problem but were able to estimate on a 
trial-by-trial basis the level of confidence associated with their strategy selection, as higher 
levels of retrospective confidence was associated with higher levels of better strategy 
selection. Moreover, when participants gave a low-confidence response to a problem, they 
selected the better strategy more often on the next problem, suggesting that participants were 
able to use the result of their metacognition to regulate their strategy selection behaviors. 
Regarding effects of age, young and older adults had comparable metacognitive accuracy 
when testing under the selection-execution task, and older participants had higher 
metacognitive accuracy than young participants in the selection-only task, particularly for 
easier homogeneous problems. Moreover, both young and older adults appear to use the 
results of this metacognitive monitoring to regulate their selection of the better strategy on the 
next problem, and to do so to the same extent. Finally, it was interesting to note that, although 
older adults tended to make more accurate retrospective judgments in the selection-only task 
than in the selection-execution task (young adults had comparable metacognitive accuracy 
across these two tasks), both young and older adults were relatively consistent in the accuracy 
of their metacognitive judgments across selection-execution and selection-only tasks. 







The present study is the first one to document age-related differences in adults’ 
metacognitive processes for strategy selection in the context of arithmetic problem solving. 
Young and older participants had to select and execute the better strategy (selection-execution 
task), to select (without executing it) the better strategy (selection-only task), and to execute 
(without selecting it) a cued strategy (execution-only task) on each problem. Participants were 
also asked to prospectively estimate the ease with which they would select the better strategy 
(EoS judgments) and to retrospectively estimate how confident they are in having selected the 
better strategy (RCJ) on each problem. Our results replicated previous findings on how young 
and older adults select and execute strategies. They also revealed how metacognitive 
processes are involved during strategy selection, and age-related differences or similarities 
therein. These findings have important implications to further our understanding the role of 
metacognitive monitoring and metacognitive regulation for strategy selection, and aging 
effects on these processes. 
Metacognition and Strategy Selection 
The most important and original finding of this study concerns metacognitive 
judgments during strategy selection in problem solving tasks. Participants made accurate 
retrospective, but not prospective, judgments. This result is consistent with previous research 
in the literature on memory or perceptive metacognition showing that prospective monitoring 
is generally more difficult and less accurate than retrospective monitoring (e.g., Siedlecka et 
al., 2016). The present findings suggest that this conclusion extends to other cognitive 
domains, like problem solving. These differences in accuracy of prospective and retrospective 
judgments could reflect differences in the cues that participants use to make their judgments, 
such as response fluency for retrospective judgments and recent outcome history for 
prospective judgments (Fleming et al., 2016; but see, Besken & Mulligan, 2013; Rhodes & 





accurate when they refer to the response already given than when they are about a future 
response because retrospective confidence results from monitoring the entire decision-making 
process and could be informed by many more sources of evidence than prospective judgments 
(e.g., Graziano, Parra, & Singman, 2015; Siedlecka et al., 2016). For instance, in the 
selection-only task, the speed with which the evaluation of the problems features has been 
completed before selecting an answer could inform participants’ retrospective judgments, but 
this information is not automatically available for prospective judgments. Either way, our 
results suggest that participants – whatever their age – did not use or detect available cues 
before completing the computational estimation tasks to predict their future strategy selection, 
but were able to do so when they had to evaluate their confidence retrospectively. These 
results are important because determining whether the better strategy was selected on each 
problem is a necessary condition for people to be able to interrupt strategy mid-execution in 
order to switch from a poorer to a better strategy after strategy selection, as postulated by 
some computational models (e.g., Lovett & Schunn, 1999; Siegler & Araya, 2005). For these 
reasons, further studies should replicate the present findings and further examine the validity 
of the original metacognitive judgments that were used in the present experiment. For 
instance, studies could determine whether the lack of sensitivity of EoS judgments for 
strategy selection was really due to an inability of participants to predict their future strategy 
selection, to the fact that EoS judgments were not sensitive enough to capture this ability, or 
to the variations in problems difficulty on a trial-by-trial basis which could have prevented 
participants to use recent outcome history with the task to make their predictions. As a first 
step to document this issue, additional analyses were conducted to determine whether absolute 
EoS judgments varied as a function of problem characteristics. Results indicated that 
participants – whatever their age or the task – did not give higher EoS scores on homogenous 





present study, participants did not use the proximity of the unit digit to 0 as a cue to inform 
their prospective judgments. Future experiments should further investigate the processes 
underlying the EoS judgments by manipulating other factors that could have influenced its 
sensitivity (e.g., presentation duration, participants’ ability to estimate digit proximity to 0). 
The present analyses also gave us the opportunity to examine strategy regulation via 
analyses of the relations between metacognitive judgments on the current problems and 
strategy selection on the immediately following problems. To our knowledge, this study is the 
first to examine whether metacognitive monitoring on one item can help participants to 
regulate their performance on the following item. Indeed, all previous studies investigating 
interactions between metacognitive monitoring and regulation processes examined whether 
lower judgments on one item lead to the implementation of appropriate strategies on the same 
item (see Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009, for an overview). In the present experiment, 
participants were able to use the result of their metacognitive evaluation on one item to adjust 
their strategy selection on the following item. Indeed, when people reported low-confidence 
in their strategy selection, they increased their rates of better strategy selection on the next 
problems. This may indicate that low-confidence responses act as a warning signal to pay 
more attention to information that is useful to select the better strategy on the next problem. 
Interestingly, this suggests that some aspects of strategy selection on processing current items 
can be influenced by metacognitive processes executed on the preceding items. Future studies 
may determine whether such sequential influences are specific to arithmetic and strategy 
selection, or whether they are also found in other cognitive domains. 
Metacognition and Strategy Selection during Aging 
Regarding how metacognition changes during aging, our data indicate that accuracy of 





select and execute the better strategy; it was even higher in older adults when participants had 
to only select the better strategy (without executing it). Moreover, both young and older adults 
were able to use the results of their metacognitive evaluation to regulate their subsequent 
strategy choices to the same extent. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that some 
metacognitive processes are spared during aging and are inconsistent with the hypothesis of 
age-related declines in older adults’ metacognitive skills (see reviews by Castel et al., 2016; 
Hertzog, 2016). Recall that Ardiale and Lemaire (2012, 2013) found that older adults were 
poorer at within-problem strategy switching. That latter result is inconsistent with the present 
findings of comparable strategy selection and metacognitive accuracy in young and older 
adults. It is possible that, although older adults are as able as young adults to judge whether 
they selected the better strategy after selecting and executing it, when they have to do this 
while they are engaged in strategy execution, as they did in Ardiale and Lemaire’s studies, 
older adults may have fewer processing resources left free to evaluate on-line whether they 
have been selecting and are executing the better strategy. The present findings of a decrease in 
metacognitive accuracy for older – but not young – adults’ when the task requires more 
cognitive resources (i.e., selection-execution task) as compared to when the task is less 
resource-consuming (selection only) is consistent with this hypothesis. Indeed, this suggests 
that older adults have optimal metacognition when the task demands are low (i.e., for 
homogeneous problems in the selection-only task), but their ability to efficiently execute 
metacognitive processes – namely, to detect and weigh information or cues allowing them to 
accurately evaluate their cognitive performance – seems to decline as task demands increase 
(i.e., on heterogeneous problems or in the selection-execution task). If this is the case, it may 
partly explain why inconsistent findings have been reported in the literature regarding aging 
effects (or lack thereof) on metacognitive monitoring. For instance, this could possibly 





judgments were made on a (resource-consuming) working-memory task while Hertzog et al. 
(2002) did not find such differences when judgments were made on a (potentially easier) 
cued-recall memory task (see also Halamish, McGillivray, & Castel, 2011). Further 
investigations should, of course, corroborate this hypothesis. Future studies should also 
examine whether the detrimental effects of task demands could be alleviated when crucial 
cues for accurate metacognitive judgments are made more salient (e.g., Thomas, Bulevich, & 
Dubois, 2011). 
Another issue that should probably be addressed in future studies concerns the 
surprising metacognitive advantage that we found for older adults over young adults in the 
selection-only task. As this advantage remained significant even when the influence of the 
arithmetic fluency was controlled, we can rule out the possibility that this effect is due to age 
differences in arithmetic skills. This advantage in older adults may possibly result from the 
fact that older adults have fewer misconceptions (e.g., driven by stereotyped beliefs) or more 
knowledge than young adults about what is an efficient strategy to solve arithmetic tasks and, 
thus, are in a better position to judge their performance (as opposed to what is traditionally 
observed in memory tasks). Indeed, several studies focusing on metacognition have shown 
that the accuracy of metacognitive judgments in one domain is positively influenced by how 
skilled we are in this specific domain (e.g., Schmitt & Sha, 2009). Interestingly, the 
implementation of the processes or knowledge that help older adults to outperform young 
adults appears to be resource-consuming. Indeed, older adults only show a metacognitive 
advantage when task demands are low. 
One of the important limitations of the present work is that stimuli were repeated 
across tasks while the order of the tasks was not counterbalanced. Although this design was 
selected on the basis of previous studies showing no order effect and no influence of problems 





ensure that our results can be replicated using other types of designs. Another limitation of 
this study is that it does not tell us how metacognitive processes influence strategy selection 
while young and older adults are selecting the better strategy. The present data clearly showed 
that young and older adults tend to have an accurately higher level of confidence after 
selecting the better strategy than after selecting the poorer strategy and tend to have an 
accurately lower level of confidence after selecting the poorer strategy relative to after 
selecting the better strategy. However, we do not know how they actually monitor their 
selection in a situation where they have to select the better strategy and the task does not 
require them to judge whether they have used the better strategy. So, we ignore whether they 
wonder if they have just selected the better strategy after strategy selection and while 
executing the just-selected strategy, or whether they wonder if they have just selected the 
better strategy before starting to execute strategies. Another important line of research would 
be to investigate which specific mechanisms account for the reduction observed in older 
adults’ metacognitive accuracy when the task demands are high. Future experiments could be 
conducted to examine whether effects of aging, task difficulty, and their interaction on 
metacognitive accuracy correlate with changes in some specific attentional or executive 
processes. Finally, the present conclusions that young and older adults are able to accurately 
judge whether they have just selected the better strategy to solve a given problem but are 
unable to determine whether it will be difficult to select the better strategy before strategy 
selection need to be replicated both in arithmetic and in other cognitive domains. If this 
conclusion is confirmed, future works will be in a better position to investigate how 
mechanisms underlying metacognitive judgments occur before, during, and after strategy 
selection, and how this changes with age during adulthood. By addressing these issues, 
computational theories of strategy selection may implement these metacognitive mechanisms 
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Mean Ease of Selection (EoS) Judgments and Mean Retrospective Confidence Judgments (RCJ) in Young and Older Adults for the Selection-
Execution and the Selection-Only Task on Rounding-Down or Rounding-up Problems with Homogenous and Heterogeneous Unit Digits. 
Task  Better Strategy 












Rounding Down 1.57 (.05) 2.60 (.05) 2.09 (.04) 1.53 (.07) 1.84 (.07) 1.69 (.05) 1.89 (.03) 
Rounding Up 1.84 (.05) 2.54 (.05) 2.21 (.04) 1.43 (.07) 1.76 (.07) 1.60 (.05) 1.91 (.03) 
Total 1.70 (.04) 2.57 (.04) 2.14 (.03) 1.48 (.05) 1.80 (.05) 1.64 (.03) 1.89 (.03) 
 RCJ 
Rounding Down 3.12 (.05) 2.70 (.05) 2.91 (.04) 3.13 (.06) 2.96 (.06) 3.05 (.04) 2.98 (.03) 
Rounding Up 3.08 (.06) 2.71 (.05) 2.90 (.04) 3.15 (.06) 2.94 (.06) 3.04 (.04) 2.97 (.03) 





Rounding Down 1.60 (.05) 2.58 (.05) 2.10 (.03) 1.62 (.06) 1.91 (.07) 1.77 (.04) 1.94 (.03) 
Rounding Up 1.92 (.04) 2.49 (.05) 2.20 (.04) 1.54 (.06) 1.46 (.05) 1.50 (.04) 1.85 (.03) 
Total 1.76 (.04) 2.54 (.04) 2.15 (.03) 1.58 (.04) 1.68 (.04) 1.63 (.03) 1.89 (.03) 
 
RCJ 
Rounding Down 3.47 (.05) 2.70 (.05) 3.09 (.03) 3.11 (.06) 2.84 (.05) 2.98 (.04) 3.04 (.03) 
Rounding Up 3.56 (.05) 2.75 (.05) 3.16 (.03) 3.16 (.07) 2.89 (.05) 3.03 (.04) 3.10 (.03) 
Total 3.52 (.03) 2.72 (.03) 3.12 (.02) 3.14 (.05) 2.86 (.04) 3.01 (.03) 3.07 (.03) 






Means, Standard Errors, and Tests of Metacognitive Accuracy (A’ROC) for Young and Older 
Participants in Selection-Execution and Selection-Only Tasks  
 EoS RCJ 
M t M t 
Selection-Execution Task 
Young adults (N=37) .47 (.02) 1.69 .60 (.02) 6.23** 
Older adults (N=29) .48 (.02) 0.59 .60 (.02) 3.66* 
All (N=66) .48 (.02) 1.44 .60 (.02) 6.71** 
Selection-Only Task 
Young adults (N=37) .48 (.01) 1.74 .63 (.02) 6.46** 
Older adults (N=29) .48 (.01) 1.09 .72 (.02) 8.52** 
All (N=66) .48 (.01) 1.66 .67 (.02) 10.03** 
Note. t tests are two-tailed comparisons against chance: 0.5 for Area under the Receiver-
Operating-Characteristic (ROC) curve (A’ROC). EoS = Ease of Selection; RCJ = Retrospective 








Figure 1. Metacognitive accuracy (A’ROC) of retrospective confidence judgments for young 
and older participants as a function of the unit digit (homogeneous vs. heterogeneous) in 
Selection-Only (top panel) and Selection-Execution (bottom panel) tasks. 
 
